Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.
Introduction
The academic community has suffered in recent years the emergence of a new industry of journals which engage in deceptive and dishonest practices, falsely claim to offer peer review and publish any article in exchange for a fee (Butler 2013 , Clark and Smith 2015 , Kolata 2013 ). This phenomenon has been studied by the scholarly librarian Jeffrey
Beall, who maintained between 2010 and 2017 a list of 'potential, possible, or probable predatory' journals and publishers who allegedly engaged in fraudulent practices. In January 2017 Beall's list included 1294 standalone journals and 1155 publishers. The rise of 'predatory' publishers has been linked to the emergence of the openaccess model (Beall 2012) . This system, favored by the newly available ICT technologies, led to the appearance of thousands of new academic journals that are funded through publication fees and are free of all restrictions on access.
2 Some of these journals have rapidly managed to gain scientific recognition for publishing high-quality articles (e.g. PlosOne), but others have been accused of dubious behavior. The lack of standards of some of these journals was documented by a sting operation conducted by journalist John Bohannon. He submitted a fake medical paper with easily detectable
flaws to 304 open-access journals, including a hundred which were included in Beall's list. Around half of these journals accepted the paper without questioning its content or providing meaningful feedbacks (Bohannon 2013) . Among Beall's list journals the acceptance rate was above 80%.
The revenues of traditional journals typically rely on the willingness of 'readers'
-mainly academic libraries -to pay for a subscription. Instead, most open-access journals depend on authors' publication fees. The shift of the burden of payment from readers to authors may have produced an important change in the incentive system.
Readers tend to be willing to pay only for journals that they consider worth reading. 1 Beall unexpectedly took down his list in January 2017. A cached copy is available at https: //archive.fo/6EByy).
2 See, for example, the Berlin Declaration on Open Access to Knowledge in the Sciences and Humanities (https://openaccess.mpg.de/Berlin-Declaration) and the Bethesda Statement on Open Access Publishing (http://legacy.earlham.edu/ peters/fos/bethesda.htm). For a discussion on the discontent with traditional publishers see Harvie et al. (2013) .
Instead, some authors may have an incentive to pay for publishing in dubious journals in the hope that their 'principals' (e.g. members of evaluation committees) will not be able to distinguish legitimate journals from predatory ones. Furthermore, some inexperienced or naive researchers may be unaware of the fraudulent nature of some journals and they may fall prey of deceptive publishers.
In this paper we study the extent of predatory publications using data from Italy and we analyze two ways in which authors may benefit from these publications. First, many institutions and evaluation agencies use 'whitelists', such as Scopus, to identify legitimate journals. We use survey information to investigate whether these whitelists include any predatory journals. Second, we hypothesize that 'principals' with a weak research background may lack the ability to assess accurately the quality of journals where authors have published and, as a result, they may give credit to dubious journals.
We use data from a large-scale evaluation to test this hypothesis.
Our main database includes information on the CVs and the evaluations received by more than 46,000 researchers who participated in the 2012 edition of the Italian National Scientific Qualification (NSQ). This qualification is required for promotion to associate or full professorship in Italy. The sample accounts for around 61% of assistant professors and 60% of associate professors in the country. Applications were evaluated by 184 evaluation committees, one per scientific field, and, as we explain in more detail below, the members of these committees were selected by random draw out of a pool of eligible evaluators. Each panel assessed more than 300 CVs, which included an average of 46 publications each.
To detect publications in dubious journals we use Beall's list. According to our findings, about 5% of applicants have published in journals that Beall has classified as 'potential, possible, or probable predatory'. Publications in these journals are more common in Southern Italy and, across the different fields, they are highest in Business and Economics. Researchers who publish in dubious journals are usually younger, they are more prolific but have fewer high-impact publications, and they tend to be based in departments with lower research quality.
The inclusion of these journals in Beall's list does not necessarily imply that they are bogus. Instead, it is possible that Beall's list is inaccurate and it includes some legitimate journals. We investigate whether these journals are truly academic using two sources of information. First, we collect information on the number of citations received by these journals from Google Scholar. Their academic impact tends to be low, only 38% of these journals have published in the previous 5 years at least 5 articles that have received at least 5 citations (including self-citations). Moreover, to learn more about their editorial practices, we surveyed a random sample of around 1,000 Italian researchers who published in these journals, with a response rate of 54%. According to our respondents, at least one-third of these journals did not provide referee reports during the revision process or had an editorial behavior that casts doubts on their integrity. Given the possibility of misreporting, we interpret this figure as a lower bound of the extent of fraud within this set of journals.
A number of respondents argue that their main motivation to publish in these journals was their inclusion in whitelists that are relevant in the Italian context, such as Scopus or the whitelist elaborated by the Italian academic authorities in Social Sciences and Humanities (ANVUR list), and the possibility that these journals may receive a positive evaluation in promotion processes. We investigate in a systematic way the validity of these two claims.
Out of the 599 Beall's list journals where Italian researchers have published their work, we find that 131 of them are included in Scopus and 213 in the ANVUR list. These journals account for over 73% of the articles in our sample that were published in Beall's list journals. The survey information confirms that at least 40% of Scopus journals and 49% of ANVUR journals in Beall's list are likely to be fraudulent.
We also investigate the returns to predatory publications in the National Scientific Qualification. 3 We find that, on average, the success rate of candidates with predatory 3 Evaluation committees were provided information on the number of articles that applicants had published in journals from the whitelists but committees had full autonomy to choose their criteria. The Italian national evaluation agency (ANVUR) collected and distributed bibliometric information on applicants. In Science, Technology, Engineering, and Mathematics, this information included the number of articles published in journals covered by Scopus, the number of citations received, and their h-index. In Social Sciences and Humanities the agency used their own list, which includes around publications is 3.5 percentage points (about 9%) lower relative to other candidates with otherwise similar CVs. This gap may reflect both the negative impact of predatory publications on the assessment of the average evaluator or the effect of other individual characteristics that are observable to evaluators but are not captured in our analysis of CVs (e.g. the content of candidates' articles). We study how the magnitude of the gap varies with the research profile of evaluators. To identify the causal effects, we exploit the existence of a mechanism of random assignment of evaluators to committees. 4 Our analysis shows that evaluators with fewer publications in high-impact journals are significantly more likely to promote authors with dubious publications. The magnitude of the effect is substantial: one standard deviation increase in evaluators' research quality decreases the returns to dubious articles by about 7 percentage points (20%). In sum, while the average committee seems to penalize applicants with publications in 'predatory' journals, these publications may have a positive return when committee members have a weak research profile. This effect is strongest in Business and Economics which, as mentioned earlier, is also the field where predatory publications are most common.
Our work contributes to the literature in several ways. We provide the first quantification of the extent of predatory publications at the country level. We consider one of the world's biggest producer of academic research. 5 While previous studies have shown that authors publishing in predatory journals tend to be predominantly based in countries with weak research backgrounds (Xia et al. 2015, Shen and Björk 2015) , our results suggest that predatory publications are also a relevant problem in Italy. We also provide novel evidence on the causes of this phenomenon. Our findings suggest that the proliferation of predatory publications may reflect the existence of severe information asymmetries in the evaluation of science. Evaluators with a weak research profile may lack the ability to assess the quality of scientific outputs. The existence 20,000, and a subset of these journals were considered A-journals. The purpose of this information was to facilitate committees' evaluation tasks and foster the objectivity of their assessments. 4 A similar empirical strategy has been used to study the impact of evaluators' gender (Bagues et al. 2017 ) and the existence of connections between evaluators and candidates (Zinovyeva and Bagues 2015, Bagues et al. 2016) . 5 According to the Scimago Country Ranking, Italy is the country with the 7th largest h-index (see http://www.scimagojr.com/countryrank.php?order=h&ord=desc. Similarly, King (2004) argues that Italy belongs to the scientific 'premier league'. of such information asymmetries in scientific evaluations might explain why some authors are willing to pay to publish in predatory journals even if they are aware of their fraudulent nature.
Finally, we show that some dubious journals have managed to be included in indexes, such as Scopus, which are used by many institutions as de facto whitelists. Our results cast doubts on the mechanical use of white-and black-lists in research evaluations, suggesting the need to complement journal lists with assessments conducted by knowledgeable evaluators. Academic evaluations that automatically give credit to publications in journals included in these lists may distort publication incentives, and they may give unfair advantages to unethical authors.
Background information 2.1 The National Scientific Qualification
Since 2010, promotions in Italian universities are decided within a two-stage evaluation system. 6, 7 In the first stage, candidates to associate and full professorships are required to qualify in a national-level evaluation known as the National Scientific Qualification (NSQ) (Abilitazione Scientifica Nazionale). Assessments are conducted separately by 184 committees, one for each scientific field defined by the Ministry of Education.
Qualified candidates can participate in the second stage, which is managed locally by each university.
The first edition of the NSQ took place between 2012 and 2014. For candidates, the submission package required the CV and a selection of publications. Researchers were able to apply to multiple fields and positions. Once the list of eligible evaluators was settled and the application deadline for candidates was closed, committee members 6 Law number 240/2010, also known as "Gelmini reform" after the name of the minister of Education. A detailed description of the system can be also found in Bagues, Sylos-Labini, Zinovyeva (2017) 7 Another recent change in the evaluation of research production in Italy concerns university funding. Since 2011, universities are periodically evaluated on the quality of their research output, and the outcome of this assessment has an impact on their funding. This evaluation combines peer-review of journal articles with the use of bibliometric indicators (Rebora and Turri, 2015) .
were selected by random draw. These lotteries took place between late November 2012 and February 2013.
Selection of committees
The pool of eligible evaluators includes full professors in the corresponding field who have volunteered for the task and satisfy some minimum quality requirements. In Sciences, Technical and Engineering fields, Mathematics and Medicine (STEM&Med), the requirement is to be above the median of full professors in the field in at least two of the following three dimensions: (i) the number of articles published in scientific journals covered by the Web of Science, (ii) the number of citations, (iii) and the Hindex. In the Social Sciences and the Humanities (SSH), eligible evaluators are required to have a research production above the median in at least one of the following three dimensions: (i) the number of articles published in high-quality scientific journals (in what follows, A-journals), 8 (ii) the overall number of articles published in any scientific journals and book chapters, and (iii) the number of published books.
Eligible evaluators may be based in Italy (hereafter 'Italian') and may also be affiliated with a university from an OECD country ('international'). International and Italian eligible evaluators have to satisfy the same research requirements. Evaluation committees include five members. Four members are randomly drawn from the pool of eligible Italian evaluators, under the constraint that no university can have more than one evaluator within the committee. The fifth member is selected from the pool of eligible international evaluators.
Randomization is conducted in a way that leaves little room for manipulation.
Eligible evaluators in each field are ordered alphabetically and are assigned a number according to their position. A sequence of numbers is then randomly selected. The same sequence is applied to select committee members in different fields. If an evaluator resigns, a substitute reviewer is selected randomly from the corresponding group of eligible evaluators. Approximately 8% of evaluators resigned after being selected in the initial random draw.
The evaluation
The evaluations are based on candidates' CVs and publications. Committee members meet several times to discuss their assessments and cast their votes. A positive assessment requires a qualified majority of four favorable votes (out of five committee members).
Committees have full autonomy on the exact criteria to be used in the evaluation.
Nonetheless, at the beginning of the process an independent agency appointed by the Ministry (ANVUR) collected information on the scientific production of all candidates and provided it to the evaluation committees. In the STEM&Med fields, this information is based on the number of articles published in journals indexed by Scopus or the Web of Science. In SSHs, it relies, among other sources, on a list of journals compiled by local experts. Committees were suggested to take this information into account.
Beall's list
The academic librarian Jeffrey Beall launched in 2012 a blacklist of publishers and standalone journals who, according to his judgement, did not comply with some basic criteria (Butler 2013 also be difficult to distinguish between a poorly managed journal and an illegitimate one.
In January 2017 Beall decided to stop updating his list and removed it from his blog. He has publicly declared that this unexpected action was due to intense pressure from his employer, the University of Colorado Denver (Beall 2017 
Citation indexes
Citation indexes provide a number of bibliometric indicators that many institutions use to rank journals and evaluate research production. The most popular ones are probably those provided by Scopus and the Web of Science. These lists include journals that allegedly satisfy some minimum requirements. For instance, Scopus, the most comprehensive of the two, claims to include only journals that (i) provide-peer review, (ii) publish issues on a regular basis, (iii) satisfy a minimum level of relevance and readability for an international audience, and (iv) have an ethics and malpractice statement (Rew 2015) .
11 Some universities and evaluation systems also consider the inclusion in Scopus and the Web of Science as a mark of quality and use the set of indexed journals as a de facto whitelist.
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One potential advantage of using citation indexes is that they may be less prone to conflict of interests and they are less expensive than expert evaluations (Régibeau and Rockett, 2006; Bertocchi et al., 2015) . On the flip side, they may provide an inaccurate measure of quality and they may encourage agents to game the incentive 11 Scopus has a broader coverage of the scientific literature than the Web of Science.
The selection criteria of the Web of Science and Scopus are explained in more detail respectively at http://wokinfo.com/essays/journal-selection-process/ and https://www.elsevier.com/solutions/scopus/content/content-policy-and-selection 12 For instance, Aalto University Guide for Researchers states that '(a)s some journals have questionable motives for their publishing activity, you should be very careful when choosing a journal.
[...] Journals listed in Publication Forum [JUFO] , Thomson Reuter's Web of Knowledge or Elsevier's Scopus are guaranteed to be established academic journals' (the bold is ours). Similarly, evaluation agencies in Italy (National Quality Assessment and National Scientific Qualification), the Russian Federation (The National Excellence Initiatives and the Russian Science Foundation) and Spain (Agencia Nacional de la Evaluación de Calidad y la Acreditación) rely on these indexes. system (Hicks, 2012) .
13 If authors anticipate the metrics that will be used to evaluate them, a problem of goal displacement may arise whereas scoring high on performance measures becomes a goal in itself, rather than a means of measuring whether a desired performance level has been attained (Wouters et al., 2015) . For example, Butler (2003) finds that, in Australia, a greater reliance on journals indexed in ISI Web of Knowledge (today known as the Web of Science) was followed by an increase of the quantity but not the quality of research. Similarly, Moosa (2016) shows that the adoption of a bucket classification system encourages researchers to submit their research to the lowest-quality journal within each bucket. Moreover, some of the journals included in these indexes, particularly in Scopus, may have limited scientific value and, allegedly, they may not even be legitimate academic outlets (Sterligov and Savina, 2016) .
More recently, some agencies are also using the information provided by Google Scholar (Bertocchi et al., 2015) . In this database, citations are computed and updated automatically and reflect all documents accessible to Google search robots that are formatted in ways that make it possible for their indexing algorithms to identify their bibliographic data or references. Hence, compared to other citations databases, it is the most comprehensive (and the less selective) one.
Empirical analysis
The structure of our analysis is as follows. First, we describe the CVs of a large sample of Italian researchers. Second, using this information we examine the number of publications that they have published in Beall's list journals and the characteristics of these authors. Third, we analyze the quality of Beall's list journals using bibliometric and survey information. Finally, we study the motivations of authors. In particular, we investigate whether publications in predatory journals may receive credit in scientific evaluations, either through their inclusion in whitelists or in expert evaluations.
Publication record of Italian researchers
Our sample includes all participants in the first wave of the NSQ that took place in 2012-2014. 14 The dataset includes information on 46,244 researchers. This accounts for around 61% of assistant professors and 60% of associate professors in Italy.
15
Applicants' CVs provide a rich amount of demographic and academic information.
As shown in Table 1 The CVs also provide information on researchers' publications between 2002 and 2012 (see Table 1 Within the set of articles published in journals, the vast majority (75%) were published in outlets indexed by Scopus or the Web of Science. The proportion is sig- 14 We downloaded in January 2014 the CVs of all applicants from the official page of the National Scientific Qualification (http://abilitazione.miur.it/public/index.php?lang=eng.
15 Source: Our own calculations using information from the Italian Ministry of Education on the identity of all assistant (ricercatori ) and associate professors (associati ) in Italy on December 31 2012.
16 Southern regions refer to Abruzzo, Molise, Campania, Apulia, Basilicata, Calabria, Sicily and Sardinia; central regions include Lazio, Marche, Toscana and Umbria; and northern regions are Emilia Romagna, Piemonte, Lombardia, Valle d'Aosta, Veneto, Trentino-Alto Adige, Friuli-Venezia Giulia and Liguria nificantly lower in Social Sciences and Humanities, probably reflecting that in these areas only 10% of articles are written in English, compared to 60% in Business and Economics and around 90% in Science, Technology, Engineering, Math, and Medicine (STEM&Med).
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To proxy for the quality of articles, we consider two different measures. In the STEM&Med fields, we ranked journals in each field by their Article Influence Score (AIS).
18 About 45% of articles by Italian researchers in these areas were published in top quartile journals. In Business and Economics as well as in Social Sciences and Humanities, we measure the quality of journals using the list of high-impact journals prepared by the Italian evaluation agency ANVUR (in what follows, 'A-journals').
About 20% of all articles in Economics and 30% of articles in Social Sciences and
Humanities were published in A-journals.
Publications in Beall's list journals
According to our calculations, out of the 1.8M articles published by researchers in our sample, 5,798 were published in journals from Beall's list. 19 There are 2,225 researchers (about 5% of the entire population) in the sample with at least one article published in a journal of the Beall's list. 70% of these authors have published only once in a Beall's list journal.
For the average researcher, it represents 0.5% of the articles listed in her CV (see Table 1 , lower panel). Since Beall monitored primarily English-language journals, we also calculate the proportion of English-language articles by Italian authors (79% of the total) that have been published in Beall's list journals. In this case, the share of predatory articles is slightly larger, around 0.9% of all articles published in English.
The propensity to publish in predatory journals differs substantially across fields. 17 We identified the language of each article based on the language used in the title. 18 Article Influence Score is similar to the journal 5-year Impact Factor, but (i) it weights citations by the quality of the citing journal and by the inverse of the number of references in citing journal and (ii) it excludes self-citations. It is available only for journals indexed in the Web of Science.
19 We collected information on Beall's list journals in January 2015. In order to identify how many articles researchers have published in journals included in Beall's list of 'potential, possible, or probable predatory journals', we match the information provided by researchers on the name and the ISSN code of journals where they have published with the ISSN code of journals included in Beall's list.
In Sciences and in Medicine, only 0.4% of articles in English were published in a predatory journal. The figure is larger in Social Sciences and Humanities (0.7%) and in Engineering (1.6%), and it is the highest in Business and Economics, where 4.1% of all articles in English were published in a journal classified by Beall as predatory. 
Characteristics of authors who publish in Beall's list journals
To describe the profile of a typical candidate who publishes in Beall's list journals, we estimate the following equation:
where B i,e is an indicator for candidates who have published in Beall's list journals, X i,e is a set of individual characteristics, and µ e are evaluation fixed effects (i.e. discipline times promotion category dummies).
Authors with predatory publications tend to be more prolific, but they publish in journals with a lower rank ( Table 2 ). They also tend to be less experienced, and they tend to be based in departments with relatively poorer research quality, as measured by the results of a national evaluation conducted by ANVUR. 20 There are also important geographical differences. Conditional on the research quality of the department, the 20 We measure the research quality of Italian departments using the score obtained by each department in a national assessment of research quality that was conducted in 2011, based on publications by faculty members between 2004 and 2010. The assessment was organized by ANVUR and it was carried out by independent experts who reviewed a selected number of research products. The resulting score varies between zero (low quality) and one (high quality). According to this metrics, the average researcher is based in a department with score 0.6 (standard deviation is 0.2). More detailed information is available at http://www.anvur.org/rapporto/.
probability of publishing in a predatory journal is 2.9 p.p. (around 60%) higher in departments located in the South of Italy. Predatory publications are less common among candidates who are based in foreign universities or candidates with non-academic jobs.
Quality of journals on Beall's list
More than 2,000 researchers in our sample have published at least one article in a journal included in Beall's list. Overall, they have published in 599 different journals, which represents slightly below 10% of the total number of journals included in Beall's list that have an ISSN code (see Table B1 , columns 1 and 2).
The presence of these journals in Beall's list does not necessarily imply that they are not legitimate journals. For instance, as mentioned earlier, around 18% of journals from Beall's list that participated in Bohannon's (2013) experiment did not accept the fake paper sent by the researcher. The proportion of journals that, despite being part of Beall's list, actually follow a legitimate editorial process might be even larger within the sample of journals in our study.
We investigate the quality of these journals using two sources of information. First, we use bibliometric information. We examine how cited are these journals according to Google Scholar. Second, we asked the authors about the editorial practices of these journals directly. We conducted an online survey among a random sample of 1,000 authors in our sample that had a publication in a Beall's list.
Bibliometric information
We use Google Scholar to gather information on the bibliometric impact of journals included in Beall's list where Italian researchers have published. We collected this information in Fall 2016. Google scholar provides information on journals' h5 index, which indicates the largest number h such that h articles published in the previous five years have at least h citations each. According to Google Scholar, only 38% of journals in the sample satisfy the criterion for being indexed in Google Scholar: to have an h5-index of five or more and to comply with simple formatting rules. Among these journals, the median h5 index is equal to 10.
We also use Google Scholar to collect information about the number of citations received by each article. As shown in Figure 2 , most of these articles have not attracted much attention. The median article has received only three citations.
21 23% of articles have not been ever cited and, if we exclude self-citations, the figure rises to one-third.
At the same time, we also observe that there is a group of articles which have received a non-trivial number of citations. The 10% most cited articles in our sample have received at least 20 citations, including one article with 399 citations.
Survey information
The journals in our sample tend to have a low scientific impact. However, this does not necessarily imply that their editorial practices are fraudulent. To learn more about it, we conducted a survey among a random sample of researchers in our database who have published in these journals. The sample was selected using a randomized design with stratification by university and field. The overall population includes 2,225 authors, who were based in 1558 different departments. We randomly assigned half of these departments to participate in the survey. The sample includes 1,088 researchers who were based in 779 different departments. As expected, the characteristics of the survey sample are statistically similar to the characteristics of the targeted population (see Table B2 , columns 1, 2 and 4).
We contacted authors by email between February 2016 and May 2016 and we asked them to complete online a survey. The translated versions of our contact email and the questionnaire are reproduced in Appendix A. In our contact email, we point out that one of the articles of the recipient has been published in a journal included in
Beall's list, and we brief the recipient about the nature of this list. 22 We also explain that Beall's list may have some shortcomings and, in order to shed some light on its 21 The titles of some of these articles provide some additional hints about their quality. In some cases, the grammar is not correct (e.g."Income Don't Influence Health"), or the paper deals with questions of presumably limited academic interest (e.g."Influence of Parmigiano Reggiano Diet on Male Sexual Behavior in Rats: Behavioral and Neurochemical Study").
22 In the case of authors who had more than one publication in a predatory journal, we selected randomly one single publication for the purpose of our survey. reliability, we are collecting information from authors about the editorial functioning of these journals. To minimize the possibility that our message might be perceived as offensive, we also make it clear that it is not our intention to question the integrity or the scientific quality of the recipient. If a given author did not answer, we sent up to three reminders.
Out of the 1,088 authors contacted, 584 completed the survey (response rate 54%).
Due to co-authorships, some respondents provided information about the same article.
Overall, respondents provide information on 549 different articles (around 59% of the initial set of articles) and 268 different journals (around 70% of the set of journals initially identified). The set of authors who participated in the survey is (somehow surprisingly) similar to the target population (see Table B2 , columns 2, 3, and 5).
The sample of respondents only differs significantly from the target sample in terms of their probability of holding a permanent position in an Italian university (73% in the target sample vs. 77% in the sample of respondents). A possible explanation for this divergence may be related to the validity of the email addresses that we used to contact authors.
23 Nonetheless, we can not exclude the potential existence of some kind of non-response bias, which might affect the interpretation results in a non-trivial way. On the one hand, researchers who are aware of the fraudulent nature of the journal may feel too embarrassed or guilty about their past behavior to participate in the survey. In this case, the sample that participated in the survey would be relatively better in terms of the quality of the journals relative to non-participants. On the other hand, researchers who have a higher opportunity cost of their time may be less likely to reply. If these researchers are less likely to publish in truly predatory journals, this might lead to a problem of 'negative' selection.
Respondents provided detailed information on the editorial practices of the journal where their article was published. 24 About 8% of respondents who recall the details of the process admit that they did not receive any referee reports and the share more than 23 We searched contact details based on the information provided in researchers' applications in 2012 for the NSQ evaluation. It is possible that researchers with a permanent position were more likely to use the same email address in 2016 than researchers with fixed-term positions.
24 A more detailed summary can be found in Table B3 .
doubles (22%) when we also consider those who reveal having received only comments related to the editing (see Table 3 , column 1). The figure rises to 26% when we also include respondents who point out that, during the revision process, they noticed something that made them distrust the integrity of the journal.
There are several potential concerns with these estimates. There might be a recall bias. We ask researchers information about events that happened several years earlier.
Some of them may fail to remember their experience accurately. There might also be a problem of cognitive dissonance: subjects may report opinions that legitimize their past behaviors and past opinions. In general, we expect these biases to lead to the underreporting of malpractices and, in this respect, our results should probably be interpreted as a lower bound of the actual degree of fraud.
Given that some respondents may underreport fraudulent practices but it is unlikely that someone mistakenly remembers an episode of academic fraud, we also construct a variable defined at the journal level that takes value one if at least one author has reported a case of malpractice. According to this metrics, at least 36% of journals behaved in a fraudulent way (Table 3 , column 2).
25
In the survey, we also asked authors how they chose the journal where the article was published. One-third of respondents replied that they learned about the journal from one of their colleagues, 27% reacted to an e-mail sent by the journal, and in 12% of the cases the submission was linked to the participation in a conference. Only 16% of respondents chose the journal because they had previously read some of the articles published there. We also asked researchers if they were familiar with Beall's list. Most of them were unaware of the existence of this 'black' list: only 10% had ever heard about it.
The survey also provides interesting qualitative evidence. Authors could include open comments and 40% of authors used this possibility to send us feedback about their experience. Some authors voice negative opinions about the journal where they published their work. Two authors put it quite bluntly:
25 Table B4 in the Appendix provides the list of journals for which at least one author has reported a case of malpractice.
I think that the journal should be shut down.
The editor in chief is a crook.
Some of the comments describe in detail the editorial practices of the suspicious journals. Sometimes the acceptance decision was done at an unusually fast pace: either automatic or in less than 48 hours from the submission. Of course, in none of these cases the authors received referee reports. In some cases, there were referee reports, but they were irrelevant. As one respondent points out:
I was invited to join the editorial board of the journal, and this is why I did not pay to get published. Subsequently, I was asked to serve as a referee, but I realized that my comments did not have any impact: the papers were published without any improvement. This journal, like many others, does not have a real editor, but a graphical technician who deals with both referees and authors. I then wrote to the editor to resign but nobody even bothered to reply.
Another irregularity was related to pricing policies. Some authors were asked to pay additional fees to ensure publication after the official publication fee was paid. Others were requested ex-post to attend a conference and pay an extra cost. In some cases, journals published articles without the explicit consent of authors, for instance, following their participation in a conference. Some respondents also complain about the practice of coercive citations, when the editor requires the authors to include among the references some articles published in the same journal, irrespectively of their actual content.
26
Not all comments were negative. Around 10% (22 respondents) provided us with positive feedbacks either praising the quality of the revision process or highlighting the academic stand of the editor in charge.
27 This is consistent with the fact that some of these articles received a significant number of citations. For example, among the top cited articles of our sample, there is research cited in articles published in top-journals like Science, PNAS, Nature review cancer, and The Lancet. But even among less cited articles, according to the feedback of our respondents, some were peer reviewed for the Italian Research Quality Assessment (VQR) and received the highest mark (excellent).
Returns to publications in Beall's list journals
Some Italian researchers admit that they have published their work in journals that do not qualify as legitimate academic outlets. Some of them argue that they were misled by the information provided by the journal. 28 Other authors admit that, while they were aware of the fraudulent nature of the journal, they expected to these publications to be useful in the national evaluations. 29 For instance, one author says that:
It is not a publication I am proud of. Indeed, I am a bit ashamed. Let me add that all the journals published by (...) are just trash. I cannot understand how they can be indexed by Scopus and, thus, count for the Research Quality Assessment.
Similarly, another author explains that:
In 2011 I participated in a conference they organized. They run several journals and they offered me to publish on a fast track in one of them.
(...) I needed a publication for the National Scientific Qualification and I accepted to publish in this journal. Today, I regret that decision.
same scientific field. I remember we had two very competent reviewers who addressed pertinent issues in the paper and helped us to improve our article. To me, this is a 'trustable' Journal." Similarly, another author argues: "The referees did an excellent job. The paper has improved substantially after their comments and suggestions." Two authors even sent us the copies of the referee reports they received as a way to demonstrate the quality of the editorial process. 28 For instance, one respondent argues: "On their website, they reported the impact factor of the journal. Unfortunately, I trusted them and did not check it out. Only after they charged me the publication fees, I realized that the journal was not indexed neither in ISI nor in Scopus."
29 Around 10% of feedbacks are related to the fact that the journal under scrutiny is indexed in Scopus or the Web of Science. Additionally, 13 feedbacks mention at least one of the two Italian national evaluations (VQR or NSQ). Interestingly, in 5 cases respondents acknowledge that the publication was useful for the evaluation.
Below we study systematically these claims. First, we study whether journals from Beall's list are included in any of the whitelists that were considered for the National Scientific Qualification. Second, we investigate whether authors received credit for predatory publications in these evaluations and we analyze the potential role played by information asymmetries associated with the lack of expertise of some evaluators.
Whitelists
Many institutions and authors use whitelists to identify journals that satisfy some minimum quality requirements. In the case of the Italian National Science Qualification, the evaluation agency considered several lists. In scientific disciplines, it relied on the citations indexes Scopus and the Web of Science. In Social Sciences and Humanities, the Italian academic authorities prepared their own whitelist of journals. We investigate whether these whitelists include journals that have been classified by Beall as predatory.
Our analysis shows that, out of the approximately 7,000 journals included in Beall's list, 284 of them are also indexed by Scopus and 14 by the Web of Science (see Table B1) We use the survey information to investigate the quality of Beall's list journals that 30 We consider the composition of these indexes in 2012 when the NSQ took place. 31 In the case of the Web of Science we consider the ranking according to the Article Influence Score; for Scopus, we consider the Scimago Journal Rank (SJR).
are also included in a whitelist (Scopus or ANVUR). The survey provides information on 74 Scopus journals and 97 ANVUR journals. The information provided by respondents suggests that many of these journals are not legitimate. As shown in Table 3 , at least 40% of Scopus journals and 49% of ANVUR journals exhibit some editorial irregularity. This figure is, if anything, larger than among other journals from Beall's list.
Expert evaluations
Evaluation committees in the National Scientific Qualification had access to CVs, and they were also provided information on the number of articles that applicants had published in journals from the corresponding whitelist. Nonetheless, they had full autonomy to choose their evaluation criteria. We study how publications in predatory journals affect evaluation outcomes and whether the expertise of evaluators plays any role.
First, we investigate the average performance of authors with predatory publications. We estimate the following equation:
where Success i,e is an indicator variable that takes value one if application i in evaluation panel e was successful and takes value zero otherwise; B i is an indicator variable that takes value one if the candidate has published in a journal from Beall's list, and X i,e is a vector that includes various measures of candidates' research productivity, as well as other individual characteristics that might be correlated with candidate quality, such as experience, the field of research, the type of position or the research quality of the applicant's department. Evaluation fixed effects (µ e ) capture any variation in the success rate of applicants who are evaluated by different evaluation panels.
On average, in each discipline and rank there are about 188 candidates aspiring promotion and about 37% of them obtain a positive assessment. As expected, individual productivity is strongly correlated with success (column 1, Table 4 ). We examine whether the evaluations received by authors with predatory publications vary depending on the research quality of committee members. This analysis faces at least two challenges. First, it requires the measurement of evaluators' research quality. Second, given that evaluators' characteristics may be potentially related to applicants' characteristics, it calls for an empirical strategy that identifies exogenous variations in the composition of committees.
We measure evaluators' research quality by the number of high-impact publications.
In the STEM&Med fields we consider publications in top quartile journals according to
Web of Science and in other areas we use the list of A-journals elaborated by ANVUR.
The results reported in Table 4 suggest that this variable is the best predictor of research quality in all disciplinary groups. To account for the varying propensity to publish in different fields, we normalize this measure among eligible evaluators in the same discipline.
To identify exogenous variations in evaluators' research expertise, we exploit the existence of a random draw that selects panelists from the pool of eligible evaluators. We compare the success rate of candidates who, due to the randomness of the draw, were eventually assessed by panels of different research quality. We estimate the following equation:
where R e is the average research quality of committee members and E(R e ) is the expected research quality of the committee. The latter variable reflects the composition of the pool of eligible evaluators and it is computed using one million simulated draws taking into account the rules of the selection process. Coefficient β 1 measures the relative success rate of authors with a Beall's list publication and β 3 captures the causal effect of committee members' research profile on their success rate.
As shown in Table 5 , column 1, committees with a lower research quality tend to be more benevolent with authors with publications in Beall's list journals. A one standard deviation decrease in the research quality of committee members increases the success rate of these authors by 6.2 p.p. (17%), relative to other candidates.
As pointed out in section 2.1, 8% of evaluators resigned after being assigned to committees and they were replaced by other randomly selected evaluators. To deal with the lack of full compliance, we use an instrumental variables strategy. We use the research quality of initially drawn committee members as an instrumental variable for the research quality of actual committee members. The estimated effect is slightly higher: authors with publications in Beall's list journals have 6.7 percentage points (or about 18%) higher success rate when evaluators' research quality is one standard deviation lower ( Table Table 5 , column 2).
In columns 3-7 we report the analysis separately for different disciplinary areas. The impact of evaluators' research quality on the success of candidates with publications in Beall's list journals is highest in Business and Economics (29 p.p.).
Conclusion
We investigate the extent of publications in 'predatory' journals and the motivations of authors who publish in these journals. We use information from a large sample of researchers who applied for promotion in Italy in 2012 and were evaluated by scientific committees at the national level. To identify dubious journals, we use Beall's list of 'potential, possible, or probable predatory' journals. The number of publications in journals from this list is relatively small, but not negligible. In a sample of around 1.8 million publications, we identify approximately 6,000 publications in journals that have been included by Beall in his blacklist. The number of these publications has been growing in recent years and, among all fields, it is particularly relevant in Business and Economics. In the last year of our sample, 2012, approximately 5% of all articles by Italian economists and management scholars in English-language journals were published in one of these journals.
To assess whether these journals are truly fraudulent, we collected bibliometric information and we conducted a survey among a sample of around 1,100 authors, with a response rate of 54%. Most of these journals have a poor scientific impact. Only 38% have a Google Scholar h-index of five or more based on the articles published in the previous five years. Moreover, according to survey respondents, at least a third of journals in the sample incurred in some fraudulent editorial practice. The survey also provides interesting qualitative information about the motivation of authors who publish in these journals. Some researchers argue that they were fooled by the misleading information provided by these journals. Other authors confess that they were aware of the dubious nature of these journals but, despite their lack of rigor, they expected to receive academic credit for these publications.
We study the validity of the latter claim empirically. Our analysis uncovers two ways in which authors benefit from publications in 'predatory' journals. First, we find that many of these journals are included in lists of journals, such as Scopus, that many institutions use as whitelists. Second, we show that authors with publications in Beall's list tend to receive relatively better evaluations when evaluators' research background is poor.
Overall, our study casts doubts on the mechanical use of whitelists and blacklists in evaluation processes. In general, a more nuanced approach to evaluations may be needed, whereas lists are combined with evaluations by experts. 32 Moreover, the research quality of these experts is relevant. Evaluators with a poor research record may reward publications in dubious journals. In sum, the proliferation of predatory journals may be a worrying symptom of the lack of accuracy of many scientific evaluations. In this respect, predatory publications may be the 'tip of the iceberg' of a much deeper problem. Research productivity indicators and experience are normalized for researchers applying to the same position and field. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. applicant is granted a qualification. Evaluators' research quality is measured as the number of Q1 articles in STEM&Med fields and as the number of A-journal articles in Business and Economics, Social Sciences and Humanities, and it is normalized for all eligible evaluators in a given field. Column 1 reports the estimate from an OLS regression. In columns 2-7, the research quality of actual evaluators is instrumented by the research quality of evaluators initially selected by the random draw. Standard errors are clustered at the field level. All regressions also include an interaction between the proportion of articles in Beall's list and the expected evaluators' research quality, which is obtained based on one million simulated draws taking into account the composition of the pool of eligible evaluators and the selection rules. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
Appendix B. Survey email and questionnaire
In this section, we report the translated version of the email and questionnaire used in our survey. The original version is available in the online appendix.
TRANSLATED VERSION
Email Subject: One of your published articles Dear [NAME SURNAME], We contact you regarding your article "[ARTICLE TITLE]" published in [JOUR-NAL TITLE].
The aforementioned article (or its publisher) had been included by prof. Jeffrey Beall (University of Colorado) in a list of "potentially, possibly, or probably" do not respect international scientific standards. To give you an example, according to prof. Beall, some of the included journals accept articles without a proper refereeing system, or include in their web pages inaccurate information concerning their impact factor, the composition of their editorial board, or their precise location. You can find more information on the list and Beall criteria at this link: [HYPERLINK TO BEALL'S LIST] "Beall's list" created a few controversies and some publishers initially included have been removed after a successful appeal. In an ongoing research project, our main goal is to shed some light on the reliability of the list and possibly to improve it. Your experience with the aforementioned journal is very important for our research.
Hence, we shall be pleased if you could devote just 2 minutes of your time to answer 7 short questions concerned with your experience with [JOURNAL TITLE]: [HYPERLINK TO QUESTIONNAIRE] We wish to make clear that our goal is not to question the seriousness of your scientific work or of other articles published in the same aforementioned journal. Our only goal is to understand its editorial functioning.
Your answers will be anonymized and employed only for research purposes. After the end of our project, also to thank you for your collaboration, we shall send you a report on the main results.
Yours sincerely,
• None
• Negative 6. According to your opinion, what should be the academic value of articles published on this journal?
• High
• Average
• Low
• Negative 7. Have you ever heard about "Beall list" before getting the invitation to participate to this survey?
• Yes
• No
In case you would like to add any comment or suggestion you can use the box below Online Appendix.
Survey email and questionnaire (Original version)
Email Oggetto: Un suo articolo scientifico pubblicato Gentile [NOME COGNOME], la contattiamo in relazione al suo articolo "[TITOLO DELL'ARTICOLO]" pubblicato sulla rivista: [TITOLO DELLA RIVISTA] .
La rivista in questione (o la sua casa editrice)è stata inserita dal professor Jeffrey Beall (Università del Colorado) in una lista di editori che, a suo parere, 'potenzialmente, possibilmente o probabilmente" non rispettano gli standard scientifici internazionali. Per esempio, secondo la ricerca del professor Beall, alcune riviste pubblicate dalle case editrici della lista, accettano articoli senza un processo di revisione, oppure riportano sulle loro pagine web informazioni non corrette circa il loro impact factor, gli editor o l'indirizzo della loro sede. Può trovare maggiori informazioni sulla lista e sui criteri utilizzati a questo link: [HYPERLINK ALLA BEALL'S LIST] La lista del professor Beall ha creato numerose controversie nel mondo accademico e alcune riviste e case editrici inizialmente sospettate di comportamenti non in linea con gli standard scientifici hanno invece dimostrato la loro assoluta correttezza. In un progetto condotto in collaborazione presso l'Università di Pisa e l'Università Aalto (Helsinki, Finlandia), vorremmo approfondire in che misura la listaè affidabile, individuare le sue criticità e, possibilmente, migliorarla. La sua esperienza con la rivista in questioneè per noi molto importante.
Le saremmo quindi molto grati se volesse dedicare solo 2 minuti del suo tempo per rispondere a 7 brevi domande relative alla sua esperienza con la rivista [TITOLO DELLA RIVISTA] . Puó farlo semplicemente attraverso questo link: [HYPERLINK AL QUESTIONARIO] Ci teniamo a chiarire che, ovviamente, le domande del questionario non hanno come obiettivo mettere in discussione la serietà del suo lavoro né quella di altri articoli pubblicati sulla stessa rivista. L'unico interesseè comprendere il funzionamento editoriale della rivista.
Le risposte saranno usate in forma anonima e solo per scopi di ricerca. Una volta completato il nostro studio, sarà nostra cura, anche per ringraziarla per la sua collaborazione, inviarle un breve report con informazioni relative a tutte le riviste che abbiamo analizzato.
Non esiti a contattarci per qualsiasi informazione aggiuntiva o suggerimento circa il nostro studio.
Cordialmente, Manuel Bagues, Università di Aalto, Helsinki (email: manuel.bagues@aalto.fi) Mauro Sylos Labini, Università di Pisa (email: mauro.syloslabini@unipi.it) Natalia Zinovyeva, Università di Aalto, Helsinki (email: natalia.zinovyeva@aalto.fi) Questionario
